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An appropriate quantitative measurement of party strength is an essential precondition 
to any further qualitative assessment of partisan influence. The existing literature offers a 
number of individual indicators but fails to integrate them into a coherent systematic 
framework. This article fills this gap by proposing a new multi-dimensional and multi-level 
framework model to operationalise and measure party strength. The soundness of the 
approach is tested on the case study of the evolution of German parties between 1991 
and 2013.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Political parties have been suffering since the late 1970s a generalised and 
substantial erosion of their electoral support, societal roots, legitimacy and ideological 
coherence.1 Despite their multi-faceted crisis, however, they continue to dominate state 
institutions and to represent the main formal linkage connecting the state and its citizens.2 
The study of party strength thus seems to retain all its interest.  
The purpose of the present article is to move forward the debate on the conceptualisation 
and measurement of the quantitative aspects of party strength. I propose to overcome the 
shortcomings of existing quantitative indicators by adapting and integrating them into a 
systematic, multi-dimensional and multi-level framework. This will enable scholars of party 
politics to measure party strength within individual components more accurately and to 
obtain meaningful estimates of overall party strength, thus providing a firmer foundation for 
a broad range of empirical studies on party influence.  
The article is organised as follows. In the first section I discuss the relevant literature on 
party strength, present a new systematic framework to operationalise it and an associated 
set of quantitative indicators to measure it and review its main features, advantages, 
problems and limits. In the second section I then test the soundness of the approach on the 
case study of the evolution of German parties in the period 1991-2013.  
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PARTY STRENGTH: BACKGROUND, CONCEPT AND OPERATIONALISATION 
Parties as Power-seeking Actors 
The literature on political parties has identified a number of possible subjective goals 
guiding parties’ behaviour. Müller and Strøm distinguish between (executive) “office-
seeking”, “policy-seeking” and “vote-seeking aims”.3 Harmel and Janda add to this a new aim 
concerned with the “representation/participation of members”.4 These objectives, however, 
are generally but instrumental steps toward a different set of end goals, as the above-
mentioned authors openly acknowledge. “Party only seek votes to obtain policy influence, 
the spoils of office, or both”, claim Müller and Strøm.5 Intraparty democracy maximisation is 
arguably better conceived as an organisational choice than as a party goal.6 In any case, the 
participation of members themselves tends to be motivated either by collective incentives 
related to the party ideological/policy goals or by selective incentives concerning material 
and status rewards.7 Finally, office itself may be valued for its “rewards […] intrinsically” or 
“only instrumentally for the ability it gives to influence policy outputs”.8 We are therefore 
left with two main categories of end goals, which might be called public influence and private 
rewards.9 On the one hand, parties strive to shape public policy, institutions and, more 
broadly, social relations according to specific interests and beliefs. Precisely whose interests 
and beliefs and they serve and how, depends from the context (e.g. ideological currents, 
social groups or more unstable constellations of voters’ preferences).10 On the other hand, 
parties also function as machines to obtain and distribute private benefits to their member 
and close supporters; in the words of Max Weber, “to attain ideal or material advantages for 
its active members”,11 for instance personal influence, social status and recognition, 
psychological rewards, employment, money and favours. In the actual practice the two goals 
are intimately connected, as the successful acquisition of private benefits by party cadres is 
ultimately dependent on winning the support of civil society actors (e.g. voters, members 
and financers), while the aggregation and representation of collective interests can hardly 
take place in absence of formal organisations defining common interests, goals and 
strategies and with the human and material means to pursue them.12  
In order to pursue both kinds of end goals, however, political parties need to first 
concern themselves with the acquisition of resources of political power13, understood as the 
assets needed to ensure their existence and increase their potential influence on the 
political system and society. It is therefore possible abstract from questions of ultimate 
motives, ideological orientation and sociological composition and to consider parties simply 
as power-seeking actors trying to maximise their control on these resources. Such control is 
here defined as party strength. A variety of such resources has been discussed in the 
literature on party goals and on political parties, the most important being: electoral 
resources, which in democratic systems are the main expression of their legitimacy and 
popular support;14 institutional resources, i.e. the control over public offices (e.g. 
parliaments, governments and presidencies), other state appointments and the recruitment 
of advisors, civil servants and employees of public and semi-public enterprises;15 
organisational resources, understood in terms of cohesion, members, activists, collateral 
organisations, staff and finances;16 and communication resources, particularly autonomous 
propaganda and coverage in the mass media.17   
The acquisition of resources of political power does not immediately coincide with an 
increase of power. If we accept Russell’s traditional definition of power as the “production of 
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intended effects”,18 what matters most is the ability of a party to translate abstract power 
into actual influence by means of appropriate activities, tactics, strategies and so on. Thus, 
an entry into the study of partisan power can be found both from the point of view of its 
preconditions and from that of its outcomes.19 I follow here the former path and focus on 
party strength defined as the successful acquisition of resources of political power. The 
advantage of this choice is that it allows to measure party strength with quantitative 
indicators, producing precise and relatively objective results. While not exhausting the study 
of party power, an appropriate operationalisation and measurement of party strength does 
provide important indications of its levels and distribution and represents a crucial 
foundation for any serious further analysis of the translation of abstract strength into actual 
influence.  
 
Operationalising Party Strength 
In the previous subsection I have argued that political parties tend to pursue two 
kinds of end goals (public and private), that in order to do that they need power, and that 
one of major aspects of it is the acquisition of resources of political power. The outcome of 
this undertaking has been defined as party strength. While a great deal of theoretical and 
empirical literature on political parties deals explicitly or implicitly with party strength, 
existing attempts to operationalise this concept in quantitatively measurable ways are 
subject to a number of weaknesses. 
The first problem is that indicators have indeed been developed to measure party strength 
within individual components, but they have never been systematised into a coherent 
analytical framework; this leads to discrepancies and gaps, hampering the comparison of 
party strength across components. In response to these problems, I have developed a 
systematic framework of party strength offering four improvements on the existing state of 
scholarship. Firstly, I clarify that there are three main ways to measure the levels and 
variations over time of party strength: in absolute terms (resources), in relative terms vis-à-
vis the party system (systemic strength) and in relative terms vis-à-vis society at large 
(societal strength). Note that, within the same political system, all three methods lead to the 
same ranking of parties. This is not the case for international comparisons, where the 
methods lead to different results and must be chosen according to the purpose of the 
analysis. Secondly, I streamline existing indicators into a coherent model with four 
components, developing new indicators when no satisfactory alternative already exists 
(notably, for governance and financial strength). Thirdly, I expand and harmonise the 
coverage of the individual indicators. Ideally, each of them should encompass the entirety, 
or a reasonably comprehensive amount, of the resources of the component it purports to 
measure. This is however rarely the case, with indicators of electoral, governance and 
financial strength generally relying on a single narrow subset of them (e.g. first chamber 
votes, first chamber seats, national cabinet seats or incomes of the party-organisation). In 
order to obtain reasonable estimates of party strength in these components I proceed in the 
following way. In the case of financial strength, I include the incomes of the party-
organisation, the net assets of the party, the incomes of national and regional elected 
representatives and of their parliamentary groups and the incomes of party-near 
foundations. All these resources are homogeneous and can be simply summed to each 
other. In the other two cases, I deem the inclusion of (at least) all directly elected 
representative assemblies and monocratic positions at both national and regional level 
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essential. These resources are however are inhomogeneous, as they refer to levels of 
governance (national and regional) and bodies (first and second chamber, monocratic 
positions) of different significance; party strength must therefore be measured with 
weighted indicators accounting for the relative importance of the level or body in question. 
Fourthly, I harmonise the temporal scope of the individual indicators. These often do not 
refer to the same temporal scope, with financial accounts expressing the incomes of the 
whole year, membership figures the numbers on the 31st of December, electoral figures the 
results on the day of the election, and so on; I express them all in end-of-the-year yearly 
rolling figures.20 
The second problem is that no indicator has ever been devised to measure overall party 
strength. The issue has been pointed out with reference to organisational power by Ignazi, 
who has advocated the development of a “combined measure” encompassing human, 
financial, collateral and communication resources.21 In the same vein, I plead for the 
necessity of indicators of overall party strength accounting for the largest possible spectrum 
of resources pursued by political parties. Unfortunately, some arguably important 
components are not (yet?) liable to an operationalisation out of theoretical and practical 
problems: for example, the bonds between parties and the organised civil society, the media 
coverage on political parties, party influence within the non-elective sections of the state 
(e.g. the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the military or hereditary offices) and the entrenchment 
of policy preferences in higher-level norms (e.g. constitutions) and jurisprudence. In all these 
components the development of adequate indicators is hampered both by the lack of 
sufficiently comprehensive data and by the difficulties in accounting for the eminently 
qualitative character of these resources. The second-best option consists in identifying a 
range of selected resources possessing the following characteristics: being quantifiable; 
being of high and proven importance to parties as means of survival and influence; covering 
a broad and balanced spectrum of distinct components. I propose to do this by building 
composite indicators of party strength based on four components (resources): electoral 
(votes), governance (relevant parliamentary seats), participatory (members) and financial 
(money). I believe that this selection offers a reasonable approximation of party strength, as 
it encompasses most key objects of party efforts generally identified in the theoretical and 
empirical literature while providing a fairly balanced mixture of indicators of institutional 
strength, organisational strength and public support.  
The result of these operations is a systematic framework operationalising party 
strength as the combination of four components and providing an associated toolkit of 
fourteen indicators, three for each component (electoral, governance, participatory and 
financial) and two for overall party strength (systemic and societal).22 The indicators selected 
for each component are summarised in Table 1; their construction and methodological 
issues are discussed in the following paragraphs.  
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TABLE 1. PARTY STRENGTH: COMPONENTS AND INDICATORS 
COMPONENT ABSOLUTE STRENGTH 
(n.) 
SYSTEMIC STRENGTH  
(%) 
SOCIETAL STRENGTH  
(%) 
A. ELECTORAL 
STRENGTH 
votes 
○ 
votes / total valid votes 
○ 
votes / eligible voters 
○ 
B. GOVERNANCE 
STRENGTH 
relevant parliamentary 
seats  
● 
relevant seats /  
total relevant seats 
● 
governance systemic strength *  
state expenditures / GDP  
● 
C. PARTICIPATORY 
STRENGTH 
members 
 
members / total members members / eligible voters 
D. FINANCIAL 
STRENGTH 
incomes and net assets  
 
 
○ 
incomes and net assets  
/ total incomes and net 
assets  
○ 
incomes and net assets / GDP  
 
 
● 
OVERALL  
STRENGTH 
- average  of all dimensions  
 
● 
average of all dimension 
(index with base-year)  
● 
 Notes: ● new indicator; ○ partially modified indicator; all other indicators are commonly in use. 
 
Electoral strength refers to the success of a party in winning popular support. I choose to 
operationalise it in terms of votes obtained in free and fair direct elections for parliamentary 
or governmental offices. An alternative possibility would be to select instead forms of 
support measured through modern public opinion techniques such as voting intentions or 
approval ratings.23 Despite the growing role played by opinion polls in guiding political 
decisions and the public debate, I reject the adoption of these indicators because of their 
numerous disadvantages: on the one hand, they are subject to statistical errors, sampling 
errors and misreporting by respondents; on the other hand, they reflect more superficial and 
volatile preferences than those expressed through the formal act of voting. Electoral 
strength will therefore be measured with the following indicators: in absolute terms, with 
the number of votes received; with reference to the party system, with the vote share (votes 
/ total valid votes); with reference to society as a whole, with the electorate share (votes / 
eligible voters). The electoral component requires weighted indicators encompassing 
elections for all legislative bodies and monocratic positions at both national and regional 
level, each weighted for its relative importance. The measurement and interpretation of 
these indicators is not excessively problematic: electoral results are usually reliable and 
readily available and known issues are numerous24 but tend to be of limited magnitude.  
Governance strength refers to the success of a party controlling the state institutions, 
particularly the elective ones. A substantial number of indicators have already been 
proposed in this component.25 Parliamentary strength has been measured with the simple 
“seat share”, with game-theoretical power indices (e.g. Banzhaff), or with weighted 
measures accounting for the different relevance of majority and opposition seats (e.g Blau’s 
“legislative power”). The first method is to be preferred from the perspective of this article, 
as it capture better the ex-ante potential benefits of parliamentary seats. Governmental 
strength has been measured with the simple “cabinet share” of parliamentary seats 
(including either only the parties actually represented in the cabinet or all the parties 
supporting it, directly or externally), with the unweighted “proportional tenure” (Taylor and 
Lijphart) or with the “share of cabinet seats” (Vowles). The preferable method is again the 
cabinet share of parliamentary seats including all government-supporting parties, because 
the abstract (and often actual) balance of power within a cabinet seems to be roughly 
proportional to this ratio.26 A separate calculation of parliamentary and governmental 
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strength, however, is of little use for my purpose, as in most democracies parliaments and 
governments are intertwined bodies responsible to each other (in presidential systems this 
is not the case, but the cabinet still needs a parliamentary support to carry out substantial 
parts of its programme) and contributing in their specific ways to common purpose, the 
production of policy outputs. It appears therefore more reasonable to encompass both sub-
components with a combined measure, defined here as governance strength. My proposed 
solution, based on the combination and adaptation of the above-mentioned methods, 
adheres to the following principles. Firstly, governance strength is operationalised in terms 
of “relevant” seats, which are defined as the seats of parties belonging to the government-
supporting coalition only (either actually represented in the cabinet or supporting it 
externally) for the governmental sub-component and as the seats of all parties represented 
in parliament for the parliamentary sub-component. Secondly, partially following Blau, the 
combination of the two sub-components will not be fixed and will vary dichotomically 
according to the size of the government-supporting coalition: if it enjoys a parliamentary 
majority, the governmental sub-component will get the lion’s share; if the cabinet is a 
minority one, the opposite distribution will occur. Thirdly, the further weighting of multiple 
bodies of each component (e.g. two chambers or, in presidential and semi-presidential 
systems, a directly elected president and a cabinet) and of each level (national and regional) 
will be done according to their relative importance. Fourthly, as a proxy for the overall 
influence of state institutions on society I propose to use the ratio between states 
expenditures and the gross domestic product. Governance strength will therefore be 
measured as follows: in absolute terms, with the number of relevant seats; in terms of 
systemic strength, with the share of relevant seats (relevant seats / total relevant seats); in 
terms of societal strength, by applying the latter indicator to the share of state expenditures 
(governance systemic strength * state expenditures / GDP). Despite their complexity, the 
indicators proposed seem to capture well both the relative control of parties over public 
offices and their overall potential influence over society at large. Data on parliamentary 
seats and governmental coalitions are usually reliable and unequivocal, except in cases of 
external supports without formalised agreements. The only serious methodological problem 
concerns the exact weighting of each body, level and sub-component (parliamentary and 
governmental), which to some extent relies on a subjective assessment.27 
Participatory strength refers to the success of a party in developing strong individual bonds 
of support, affiliation and involvement going beyond the mere act of voting. Many such 
relations exist and constitute in theory a reasonable basis for an operationalization: for 
instance, the links between a party and its full-time activists, its active members, its formal 
membership, its active sympathisers or the “party identifiers”.28 I opt for indicators based on 
formal membership figures on the grounds that partisan identification is the expression of 
too impalpable a relation, which does not necessarily involve any concrete act of support for 
the party in question, and that other relations are generally not quantifiable due to the lack 
of sufficiently comprehensive data. Consequently, participatory strength can be expressed in 
absolute terms with the number of members, in terms of systemic strength with the share of 
members (members / total members) and in terms of societal strength with the M/E 
indicator (members / eligible voters). Eventual multiple subsets of membership figures can 
be added to each other without weighting. The value of these indicators suffers from two 
main problems. On the one hand, what being a party member concretely means (e.g. the 
average level of commitment) varies in each country and individual organisation. On the 
other hand, membership figures may be inflated or altogether missing for certain years and 
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organisations, as they are usually based on uncontrollable voluntary declarations or 
estimates.  
Financial strength refers to the capacity of parties to attract material resources – monetary 
or in kind. This component can be operationalised in a number of ways, for instance on the 
basis of campaign expenditures, yearly expenditures, yearly incomes or net assets.29 Partially 
departing from the common usage, I suggest doing it on the basis on yearly incomes plus net 
assets at the end of the previous fiscal year, which capture well the total amount of 
resources available to a party for consumption or saving. Financial strength can therefore be 
measured as follows: in absolute terms, with the amount of financial resources available 
(yearly incomes and net assets);  in terms of systemic strength, with the share of financial 
resources (yearly incomes and net assets / total yearly incomes and net assets); in terms of 
societal strength, with the share of financial resources on the gross domestic product (yearly 
incomes and net assets / GDP). Subsets of financial figures can be summed without 
weighting. In the calculation of the indicators attention must be paid to add the broadest 
possible number of financial resources, which are often not included in the yearly financial 
statements of the parties; in particular, the incomes of MPs and parliamentary groups at 
both national and regional level. The value of the indicators may be somewhat problematic, 
as figures generally tend to be understated due to irregular reporting (financial statements 
are rarely subjected to stringent controls), black funds and accounting practices. In 
particular, resources made available to parties without charge by their own members, by the 
state or by collateral and friendly organisations (e.g. volunteer work, office and meeting 
spaces and favourable media coverage) always escape quantification. 
Finally, overall party strength refers to the success of a party in acquiring the entire range of 
politically relevant resources. I propose to operationalise it in terms of unweighted averages 
of the four above-mentioned components: electoral, governance, participatory and financial. 
All the components so far discussed are, properly speaking, incommensurable: they refer to 
qualitatively different kinds of resources, expressed with different units of measurement and 
lacking clear conversion rates or a common universal equivalent. As a consequence, an 
indicator of overall party strength in absolute terms is a logical impossibility. Overall party 
strength in systemic terms, on the contrary, can be easily expressed by a composite indicator 
built as the unweighted average of all available components. Overall party strength in 
societal terms, finally, may be measured for certain purposes only. An unweighted average 
of the various systemic shares has little meaning in itself, as each individual share measures 
a unique kind of relation between a party and society. When expressed in terms of indexes 
with a common base-year, however, they too can be aggregated into a composite indicator 
offering a syntetic expression of the overall direction of these relations, and therefore of the 
rise or decline of partisan strength vis-à-vis society at large. Theoretically, it is not clear 
whether all components should carry the same weight or whether they should be attributed 
a differential importance – in general and over time. The option of not weighing the 
components should in my opinion be preferred on the ground of the absence of substantial 
evidence in favour of alternative choices. While governance strength may seem prima facie 
to be the single most important component, the empirical analysis of Müller and Strøm has 
established that vote-seeking behaviour is at least as prevalent among party leaders.30 
Political parties of advanced economies have been experiencing since the late 1970s a rapid 
and nearly universal membership decline;31 nevertheless, membership size still matters on 
many grounds (to sustain the party organisation, to consolidate electoral gains, to carry on 
effective extra-parliamentary strategies and to influence the public discourse). Finally, the 
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availability of large financial resources may in certain conjunctures even be detrimental to 
the public image of parties, but it remains essential to their organisational survival and 
development and looms large in the calculations of both the party in central office and the 
party in public office.32 As already remarked, these indicators fail to account for important 
power resources, particularly collateral linkages with civil society organisations and social 
movements, the control of the public debate through traditional, mass and new media and 
the control of non-elective state organs. I am nevertheless confident of their value as 
adequate approximation of overall party strength and as substantial improvements over the 
default alternative, that is assessing party strength on the basis of a single layer of a single 
component (e.g. first chamber votes, first chamber seats or national cabinet seats).  
 
Applications and Limits 
The proposed framework and associated toolkit of quantitative indicators can be 
usefully applied to a wide range of empirical analyses on the amount of resources controlled 
by parties (absolute strength), on their relative distribution within the political system 
(systemic strength) and on the strength of parties within society at large (societal strength). 
In particular, it enables one to compare in a consistent manner variations of party strength 
over time, across nations and across four components (electoral, governance, participatory 
and financial) and to obtain benchmark values for overall party strength. The framework is 
best adapted to the analysis of parties within democratic systems. The analytical value of the 
indicators proposed, of course, ultimately relies on the scope, quality and reliability of the 
primary data available and on the reasonableness of the weighting process, particularly in 
determining the relative importance of each electoral series (e.g. first chamber, second 
chamber, regional assemblies and presidential votes), of each relevant governance body, 
and of each component of overall strength (which are here considered equally important).           
The framework can be subjected to a number of criticisms.  
A first group of objections, which deals with the selection of relevant components and their 
operationalisation, has been answered in the previous sub-section. 
A second group of objections deals with the choice to approach party power from the point 
of view of its ex-ante resources rather than of its ex-post effects. This is justified by my 
identification of three separate stages in the analysis of partisan power, which are 
complementary but must be kept distinct. The first stage refers to the mere acquisition of 
relevant resources; the second to the ways in which they are actually employed by parties; 
the third to the outcomes of their use, i.e. the ultimate success or failure in translating 
abstract power into actual influence. Analyses focusing on the intrinsically or situationally 
unequal qualitative importance of specific resources (e.g. coalition and blackmail potential, 
pivotal role for governmental formation, party cohesion or Banzhaf power indices)33 
properly belong to the second stage. Ex-post analyses of actual influence (e.g. conflict-
winners or veto-players)34 to the third. Both have been excluded from my analysis, which 
aims to provide an accurate measurement of the ex-ante control on resources of political 
power. In my opinion this constitutes a necessary precondition of subsequent stages of 
analysis. More specifically the indicators, beyond their intrinsic interest as measures of 
abstract ex-ante strength, may provide the foundation to develop modified measures 
accounting for the above-mentioned second-stage qualitative issues and a useful benchmark 
for quantitative and qualitative assessments based on ex-post methodologies.    
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A third very serious objection is the explicit or implicit claim of several scholars that the 
study of party strength is largely redundant, insofar as the essential features of the political 
process would be actually shaped not by parties but by other policy-makers or by impersonal 
processes. Schonfeld’s devastating review of the functionalist literature, for instance, 
concludes that “the researcher identifies a function (or a set of functions) of parties viewed 
as crucial for the political system; evidence and analysis lead to the conclusion that this 
function (these functions) is (are) not performed or not performed well”.35 Other scholars 
have pointed out the relative powerlessness of political parties in shaping policy outputs vis-
à-vis the actions of the state bureaucracy, interest groups, social movements, charismatic or 
technocratic leaders, the judiciary, foreign states, supranational institutions, and 
transnational industrial or financial conglomerates.36 These critiques are in my opinion 
broadly correct in pointing to the limits of party politics but, in my opinion, do not make its 
study redundant: far from replacing political parties, all these influences typically continue to 
operate through their interface. The main question is therefore not if parties are powerless, 
but who controls them and who shapes their environmental constraints. 
Finally, this article does not concern itself with the question of identifying the causal 
determinants of party strength; it is in this respect a descriptive and not explanatory work. 
By providing a theoretically-grounded, coherent and harmonised framework to measure 
party strength, however, it paves the way for further empirical research on this essential 
topic. Likely candidates for the role as determinants are on the one hand the individual 
components vis-à-vis overall party strength, and on the other hand classic politological 
variables of an ideological, sociological, situational and historical kind, such as ideological 
proximity to the median voter, issue ownership and cleavage formation.37 
In the following section I will carry out a first testing of the potential and limitations of the 
proposed framework by applying it to the case study of the evolution of party strength in 
Germany from 1991 to 2013.   
     
CASE STUDY: PARTY STRENGTH IN UNIFIED GERMANY, 1991-2013 
The past quarter of century has been a period of important transformations for the 
strength German parties.38 Firstly, the traditional two-and-a-half system has been 
definitively rendered obsolete by the consolidation of two additional parliamentary parties, 
B90/GRÜNE and DIE LINKE. Secondly, the relative balance of power between parties has 
experienced substantial short-term and long-term changes. Finally, the declining levels of 
electoral participation, party membership and public satisfaction have tended to erode the 
legitimacy of German parties, particularly the traditionally dominant ones, fuelling a large 
literature on the crisis of parties and on political disaffection (Politikverdrossenheit).39 This 
section will show how a systematic quantitative analysis of party strength can provide the 
foundations of a more accurate understanding of these phenomena.  
 
Methodological Remarks 
 The case study refers to German political parties over the period 1991-2013. The 
choice of the country is mainly motivated by the relative stability and pervasive state 
regulation of political parties in Germany, which allows testing the framework in a consistent 
manner and with data of a good reliability, coverage and quality. The timeframe coincides 
the post-unification history of the Federal Republic of Germany.  
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 The dataset includes a total of 187 parties, only a minority of which have taken part 
in federal elections (62), have been represented in a state (16) or federal (6) parliament and 
have participated to a state (9) or federal (5) government. The data for the electoral and 
governance components include all parties which ever participated to German elections or 
had a public official elected in the period concerned. The data for the participatory and 
financial components are limited to 41 parties only, due to a lack of reliable sources; the 
total membership and financial figures for the missing cases, however, are almost certainly 
of a negligible magnitude. 
 The indicators of party strength are built as follows. The composite indicators of 
governance strength are built by combining the relevant parliamentary seats in Bundestag, 
in the Bundesrat and in the Landtage at both governmental and parliamentary level. The 
relative weights of the three bodies have been set at 60 per cent, 6.7 per cent and 33.3 per 
cent. The relative weight of the parliamentary and governmental sub-components of each 
body instead varies: if the cabinet enjoys a parliamentary majority, government-supporting 
seats (including externally supporting parties) are weighted 80 per cent and parliamentary 
seats 20 per cent; if the cabinet is a minority one, the weights are reversed. The sources for 
the data are official federal and regional sources and other websites. The composite 
indicators of electoral strength are built by combining the list votes (Zweitstimme) for the 
national parliament (Bundestag) and those for the regional assemblies (Landtage), with 
minor adaptation in the cases of Bayern, Hamburg and Bremen. The weights are set at 60 
per cent to the former and 40 per cent to the latter. The source for the data is the official 
Federal Returning Officer.40 The simple indicators of participatory strength are built by 
adding to the semi-official figures of Niedermayer for the main 6 parties41 to the 
membership figures of 35 minor parties as declared in their financial statements or as 
estimated. The simple indicators of financial strength, finally, are built by adding together 
official figures or estimates for net assets of the previous year, yearly incomes of the party 
organisation, yearly incomes of party foundations and of national and regional parliamentary 
groups (detracting retained past incomes), and the discretionary incomes of national and 
regional party MPs (basic salary plus allowances for expenses and collaborators). The 
method leads to some double-counting to the detriment of the largest parties (contributions 
and donations to the party by its elected representatives or employees) but also fails to 
include some of their actual incomes (e.g. salaries of executive officials and external incomes 
of party-owned companies). The totals are almost three times higher (366.5 per cent) than 
the commonly-used figures referring to the party-organisation level only. The sources for the 
data are the official financial statements of parties and parliamentary groups and federal 
and regional budgets. The composite indicators of overall strength, finally, are build with 
simple averages of the four above-mentioned components. 
 The concrete weighting of the different levels and bodies of a given political system 
in view of the construction of composite indicators inevitably retains a certain degree of 
arbitrariness, as the literature does not offer a commonly accepted method to estimate their 
relative importance. On the basis on a variety of quantitative and qualitative facts I propose 
here provisional proportions that seem to me roughly correspondent to reality and 
reasonably acceptable by the community of scholars of the German political system. I 
believe most scholars would be likely to agree on the following principles: (i) the weight of 
the regional layer in Germany is substantial but smaller than the national one,42  hence the 
choice of a 1/3 to 2/3 ratio; (ii) the role of the Bundesrat is much inferior than that of the 
Bundestag but not insignificant,43 hence a choice of a 1/10 to 9/10 ratio; (iii) governmental 
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majorities largely dominate parliaments, except in cases of pure minority cabinets; hence 
the choice of a reversable 2/10 to 8/10 ratio; (iv) national and regional elections are as 
important as the body they directly or indirectly contribute to form.44 Further research by 
institutional and policy specialist is however welcome to fine-tune these weights to the 
German and other national contexts.   
All values are based on “rolling” yearly end-year figures; the full dataset with sources 
and methodological remarks can be accessed on this journal’s website. The measures of 
absolute strength are omitted, as they are not relevant in a single-country analysis.          
        
Systemic Strength 
 
The post-reunification German party landscape is well known for comprising two 
major parties (the Christian democratic CDU/CSU and the social democratic SPD), three 
medium-sized “third parties” (the liberal FDP, the ecologist B90/GRÜNE and the radical left 
DIE LINKE45) and a variety of predominantly extra-parliamentary minor organisations. The 
use of the framework proposed in this article can help identifying with accuracy their relative 
strength and its variation across components and over time. In particular, it can refine our 
understanding of the apparent decline of the two main people’s parties and of the 
simultaneous rise of their smaller competitors. 
A static analysis of the long-term average values of the indicators of systemic 
strength over the period 1991-2013 (see Table 2) returns three interesting findings. Firstly, 
overall systemic strength can be accurately quantified as follows: CDU/CSU 42.8 per cent – 
CSU only 9.2 per cent -, SPD 36.6 per cent, FDP 6.9 per cent, GRÜNE 6.0 per cent, LINKE 4.5 
per cent and minor parties 3.4 per cent. The conventional picture based on electoral results 
is confirmed in its essential traits – ranking and magnitudes – but refined in the details, with 
gains for the two main parties and losses for all others. Secondly, the balance observable at 
the national level is not greatly altered by the inclusion of the regional level. The work 
required by the construction of composite indicators would therefore seem to be almost 
superfluous in the German case, as simple indicators referring to the sole national level 
already offer a good approximation of overall values. As I will show below, the discrepancies 
between the two levels are of little relevance in static terms but substantial in dynamic 
terms. Nevertheless, the point highlights the relative homogeneity of the German political 
system, shaped by the presence of durable and cohesive parties and similar electoral laws at 
both levels of governance. In countries lacking these conditions, France and Italy for 
instance, discrepancies between levels can be expected to be already visible at the stage of a 
static analysis. Thirdly, the adoption of a multi-dimensional approach does instead matter. 
While the ranking of the parties in each component generally remains the same, their 
relative strength greatly varies: the CDU/CSU from 39.7 (financial) to 47.9 per cent 
(governance); the SPD from 33.6 (electoral) to 38.8 per cent (participatory); the FDP from 4.2 
(participatory) to 8.0 per cent (electoral); the GRÜNE from 2.8 (participatory) to 8.1 per cent 
(financial); the LINKE from 1.7 (governance) to 6.0 per cent (electoral); and minor parties 
from 0.2 (governance) to 5.6 per cent (electoral). Generally speaking, the two main parties 
are favoured in all components except the electoral one, while the governance component 
penalises LINKE and minor parties, the participatory component FDP and GRÜNE and the 
financial component minor parties only.    
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TABLE 2. SYSTEMIC STRENGTH, 1991-2013 AVERAGE 
DIMENSION CDU/ 
CSU 
SPD FDP GRÜNE LINKE MINOR TOTAL CSU 
A. Electoral strength 38.9% 33.6% 8.0% 7.9% 6.0% 5.6% 100.0% 7.4% 
     National (60%) 37.9% 33.9% 9.1% 7.8% 6.4% 4.8% 100.0% 7.3% 
     Regional (40%) 40.5% 33.1% 6.2% 8.0% 5.3% 6.9% 100.0% 7.6% 
B. Governance strength 47.9% 37.1% 7.8% 5.2% 1.7% 0.2% 100.0% 10.2% 
     National (60.0%) 47.7% 36.0% 9.7% 5.3% 1.2% 0.0% 100.0% 8.6% 
           Gover. coalition 49.4% 36.0% 9.9% 4.7% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 8.8% 
           Parliament 40.9% 36.1% 9.2% 7.6% 6.2% 0.0% 100.0% 7.7% 
     Bundesrat (6.7%) 50.6% 39.5% 4.5% 3.4% 1.7% 0.3% 100.0% 9.2% 
     Regional (33.3%) 48.1% 38.4% 5.1% 5.3% 2.5% 0.5% 100.0% 13.1% 
           Gover. Coalitions 48.9% 39.5% 4.9% 4.8% 1.7% 0.2% 100.0% 14.2% 
           Parliaments 44.1% 35.5% 5.4% 8.0% 5.3% 1.8% 100.0% 8.8% 
C. Participatory strength 44.7% 38.8% 4.2% 2.8% 5.1% 4.3% 100.0% 10.1% 
D. Financial strength 39.7% 36.9% 7.8% 8.1% 5.5% 2.0% 100.0% 9.0% 
Overall strength 42.8% 36.6% 7.0% 6.0% 4.6% 3.0% 100.0% 9.2% 
 
A dynamic analysis of the short-term variations of the indicators further highlights 
the advantages of adopting a multi-level and a multi-dimensional approach. On the first 
account, the national and regional level are asynchronous and their values thus diverge 
substantially at specific points of time. Regional elections and parliaments are particularly 
important for territorial or quasi-territorial parties (e.g. CSU in Bavaria, PDS in the former 
GDR territory and SSW in Schleswig-Holstein), for emerging organisations striving to 
establish themselves as credible national political forces (e.g. far right organisations, 
PIRATEN and AfD), for medium parties trying to recover from severe national defeats 
(GRÜNE after 1990, LINKE after 2002 and FDP after 2013), for one of the two major parties 
when confined to the opposition at the federal level and for building the momentum of 
major electoral shifts (e.g. SPD in the mid-1990s, CDU and LINKE in the mid-2000s). The 
leaning of regional governments, in turn, is normally very different from that of the national 
one.46 On the second account, the various components of systemic weight do not necessarily 
move in unison. This is well exemplified by the case of the CDU/CSU (Figure 1): its electoral 
strength has proceeded until 2012 along a broadly declining trajectory, its financial strength 
has remained remarkably stable, its participatory strength has gradually increased and its 
governmental weight has followed a pendulum-like movement, with major shifts in the 
alternation years.  
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FIGURE 1. SYSTEMIC STRENGTH, CDU/CSU 
 
 
The study of each individual component offers further findings on the changes 
affecting the German party system over the last decades.  
The electoral arena is the place where the malaise of the German Volksparteien has 
expressed itself most forcefully. Over the whole period the CDU/CSU ranked first (38.9 per 
cent) and the SPD a not-so-distant second (33.6 per cent), while all other parties were left 
much behind (FDP 8.0 per cent, GRÜNE 7.9 per cent, LINKE 6.0 per cent, minor parties 5.6 
per cent). The combined vote share of the two main parties, which had already fallen from 
over 90 percent in the 1970s to 78.6 per cent in 1991, declined slightly until 2002 (77.0 per 
cent) and collapsed to 59.0 per cent in 2012, before recovering to 65.8 per cent in 2013. In 
the decade 2002-2012 smaller parties were able to grow at their expense; CDU/CSU and to a 
less extent the SPD, however, have demonstrated in the 2013 general election that their 
death knell has not yet sounded.  
The distribution of governance strength is very different, strongly favouring the two largest 
parties and penalising the others, with the exception of the liberals. Over the whole period 
the CDU/CSU came close to an absolute majority (47.9 per cent); the SPD was a far second 
(37.1 per cent) followed by FDP (7.8 per cent), GRÜNE (5.2 per cent), LINKE (1.7 per cent) 
and minor parties (0.2 per cent). The main determinant of these disproportionalities are the 
5% electoral thresholds and prevailing patterns of governmental formation: the former 
makes it very difficult for minor parties to access parliaments47 and excludes even medium 
parties from a number of regional assemblies; the latter further penalises LINKE and minor 
parties, which are rarely considered as viable coalition partners.48 The evolution of 
governance strength over time was very dynamic, with huge swings at every national 
governmental alternation (1998, 2005, 2009 and 2013). The combined share of the two main 
parties has not followed a uniform declining tendency (85.5 per cent in 1991, 92.8 per cent 
in 2005, 74.7 per cent in 2009, 88.8 per cent in 2013), because the progressive loss of 
parliamentary seats has been compensated by an increase of the frequency of grand 
coalition governments. This is mainly a consequence of the behaviour of the national SPD 
which, when faced with notional centre-left parliamentary majorities, has generally 
preferred to govern with the CDU (2005-2009, 2013-present) rather than experiment with 
red-red-green coalitions.49 The growth of medium and minor parties has been steady at the 
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regional level but fickle at the national and Bundesrat ones, determining a trendless overall 
effect. 
The participatory component, surprisingly, also contradicts the perception of a crisis of the 
two dominant parties. In average, the participatory balance of power favoured CDU/CDU 
(44.7 per cent) and SPD (38.8 per cent) and downsized all other parties. The ranking also 
changed: DIE LINKE came third (5.1 per cent), FDP fourth (4.2 per cent), GRÜNE a poor fifth 
(2.8 per cent) and minor parties showed a surprising strength (4.3 per cent). Interestingly, 
the gap between first and second was initially inexistent but dramatically widened 
afterwards.50 Although the data should be taken with some caution, as the members of the 
larger parties are known to be less active than those of smaller ones,51 the advantage of the 
people’s parties in this component remains unquestionable. Their combined membership 
weight actually increased from 80.8 per cent in 1991 to 85.3 per cent in 2001, before slowly 
falling back to 79.9 per cent in 2013.  
The financial component favours the SPD, penalises minor parties and leaves the values of 
all other parties fairly unchanged. The distribution of resources is remarkably similar to that 
of the parliamentary sub-component of governance strength: this is hardly surprising, as 
31.1 per cent of the total resources derive from elected representatives and their 
parliamentary groups and 22.6 per cent from party-near political foundations (which obtain 
state funding in a manner roughly proportional to the medium-term parliamentary strength 
of their parties). The remaining portion (46.3 per cent) is represented by incomes and net 
assets of the party-organisation, of which slightly less than half can be estimated to derive 
from state funding highly proportional to electoral results. Over the whole period the 
CDU/CSU (39.7 per cent) had a slight advantage over the SPD (36.9 per cent), followed by 
GRÜNE (8.1 per cent), FDP (7.8 per cent), LINKE (5.5 per cent) and minor parties (2.0 per 
cent). The combined weight of the two main parties remained stable from 1991 (77.5 per 
cent) to 2005 (77.9 per cent) but declined afterwards (2013: 71.0 per cent). 
Finally, the evolution of the 4-item composite indicator of overall systemic strength is 
depicted in the following figures (Figure 2 and Figure 3). The measure seems to capture well 
all major elements of change in the distribution of systemic weight among German parties 
underlined by the quantitative and qualitative literature: the importance of national 
governmental alternations (1998, 2005, 2009 and 2013), the accelerating crisis of the SPD in 
the period 2002-2009, the rise of minor parties in the years of economic storm (2007-2012), 
the relative stabilisation of 2013 and the unstable trajectories of FDP, GRÜNE and PDS/DIE 
LINKE. From a statistical point of view, this measure shows neither too strong nor too weak a 
correlation with the vote share, the most used measure of party strength, thus proving its 
usefulness as a new synthetic indicator operationalising this concept.52        
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FIGURE 2. OVERALL SYSTEMIC STRENGTH, LARGE PARTIES  
 
 
FIGURE 3. OVERALL SYSTEMIC STRENGTH, SMALLER PARTIES 
 
 
On the basis of the preceding analysis it is possible to propose a periodisation of the 
recent evolution of the German party system into three clear phases. 
The first phase, lasting from 1990 to 2002, was characterised by a remarkably stable 
predominance of the two main parties (combined overall weight of over 80 per cent) within 
a pattern of periodic alternation (swing toward the SPD in 1998, slow recovery of the 
CDU/CSU afterwards).  
The second phase, from 2002 to 2012, saw instead the build-up of a strong challenge to the 
predominance of the two main parties. Their combined values fell strongly in the electoral 
component (-18.0 points) and more moderately in the financial (-8.0 points) and 
participatory (-4.0) ones. The formation of traditional one-and-a-half governmental 
majorities (CDU/CSU and FDP, SPD and Greens, SPD and FDP) became increasingly difficult. 
CDU/CSU and SPD managed to soften the consequences of these trends only by 
   Accepted Manuscript – German Politics, 2016                       16 
 
 
 
monopolising the access to government through the increasingly frequent practice of grand 
coalitions at the national and regional level. Their governance strength thus actually rose in 
the period of the second “grand coalition” (2005-2008), before falling precipitously in the 
years of the black-yellow government (2009-2012) - with total loss of -12.2 points. The 
overall strength, finally, saw a total loss of 10.5 points to a trough of 70.7 per cent in 2012. 
The roots of this crisis were multiple: the progressive turn of the SPD toward hard neo-
liberal solutions in socio-economic policy, which destabilised its traditional voters and 
members and turned them toward disengagement or alternative options, notably the Left 
Party;53 the suspension of the traditional alternation in the years 2005-2008; the effects of 
the economic crisis; and the unprecedented success of medium and minor parties in gaining 
the ownership of burning political issues such as social justice, environmentalism, digital 
rights, the eurocrisis and immigration.54 
The third phase, begun in 2013, is still difficult to assess. The two main parties, particularly 
the CDU/CSU, have pulled off a surprising recovery at the September 2013 federal election, 
and their overall systemic strength has risen again to historically low but substantial levels 
(76.4 per cent). This may soon prove to be a merely temporary parenthesis of an inevitable 
long-term decline: various signals seem to point this way, most importantly the perspective 
of a long period of blocked competition and permanent grand coalition governments (to the 
hostility between SPD and DIE LINKE at the federal level, which has made this outcome 
increasingly likely since 2005, was added in 2013 the collapse of the FDP, which deprived the 
CSU/CSU of its traditional junior partner). However, Poguntke’s diagnosis that the people’s 
parties are “losing their dominant position within the German party system”, marking a 
“normalisation of German party politics”,55 seems to have been way too premature, 
especially when compared with the much more advanced crisis of traditional bipartism in 
countries such as Greece, Spain and France.       
 
Societal Strength  
A shift of attention from systemic to societal strength allows one to assess the 
strength of German parties in relation to society at large. From this standpoint, all the 
familiar signs emphasised by the literature on the crisis of political parties reappear with 
unequivocal force.  
In static terms, German parties retain an acceptable level of societal strength (see Table 3). 
Over the whole period their total electoral strength stood at 71.1 per cent; their 
participatory strength at 2.81 per cent; their governance strength at 46.6 per cent and their 
financial strength at 0.072 per cent. These values are broadly in line with contemporary 
Western European standards (probably higher in terms electoral and financial terms and 
lower in participatory terms) and do not point to any deep crisis of legitimacy, external 
power or internal organisation.  
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TABLE 3. SOCIETAL STRENGTH, 1991-2013 AVERAGE 
DIMENSION CDU/ 
CSU 
SPD FDP GRÜNE LINKE MINOR TOTAL CSU 
A. Electoral strength 27.7% 24.0% 5.6% 5.6% 4.2% 4.0% 71.1% 5.3% 
B. Governance strength 22.4% 17.3% 3.7% 2.4% 0.8% 0.1% 46.6% 4.7% 
C. Participatory strength 1.25% 1.10% 0.12% 0.08% 0.15% 0.12% 2.81% 0.28% 
D. Financial strength 0.029% 0.027% 0.006% 0.006% 0.004% 0.001% 0.072% 0.006% 
 
In dynamic terms, however, the tendency toward a loss of societal strength is unmistakable 
(see Figure 4). Between 1991 and 2013 the electoral indicator has lost 10.5 per cent of its 
value, the governance indicator 3.7 per cent, the financial indicator 7.7 per cent and the 
participatory indicator a staggering 42.1 per cent; the result has been a fall of the indicator 
of overall strength by 16.0 per cent. The negative trend has been without exceptions in 
terms of participatory strength, concentrated in the years 2002-2009 in terms of electoral 
strength, and fairly discontinuous in terms of governance and financial strength. In other 
words, the German parties have been suffering of a large exit of their members and voters, 
while their control over financial resources and over the state institutions has oscillated 
without experiencing an unambiguous downward trend. For scholars attached to “strong” 
conceptions of democracy focusing on electoral and participatory linkages these findings are 
disturbing, as they broadly confirm that movement of parties from accountable agents of 
civil society to unresponsive appendages the state emphasised by Katz and Mair56 which 
might be undermining their legitimacy and the very essence of modern popular 
sovereignty.57 This is not necessarily the view of social and partisan elites, who may even see 
the growing political disengagement of the citizenry as an opportunity to govern 
unencumbered by excessive popular demands, provided that this does not result in a 
substantial rise of populist challengers or anti-parliamentary movements. So far, the 
declining electoral, institutional and participatory representativeness of German parties has 
not (yet) fundamentally threatened their ability of carrying on with “politics as usual”.   
 
FIGURE 4. OVERALL SOCIETAL STRENGTH, ALL PARTIES (INDEX 1991 = 100) 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This article has presented a new systematic framework for operationalising and 
measuring party strength, defined in terms of acquisition of power resources. The approach 
has been then tested on the case study of the evolution of German parties between 1990 
and 2013. 
The proposed framework enables a reasonable operationalisation and an accurate 
and coherent measurement of the levels and variations of party strength: a) in absolute 
terms (absolute strength), vis-à-vis the party system (systemic strength) and vis-à-vis society 
as a whole (societal strength); b) across four components (electoral, governance, 
participatory and financial) and in overall terms; c) over time. The problems of the existing 
scholarship on the topic are addressed by providing a toolkit of fourteen improved and 
harmonised indicators of party strength, thereby offering a firmer foundation for the 
analysis of a wide range of aspects of party politics. The main limit of the framework is its 
failure to account for some important components of party strength: communication 
resources, collateral linkages and presence within non-elective sections of the state. This is 
due to the conceptual and practical obstacles to their operationalization into quantitative 
indicators. One important future avenue of research, therefore, will concern the possibility 
of developing meaningful “proxy” indicators in these areas. The accuracy and heuristic value 
of the findings also critically hinges on the reasonableness of the choices made in weighting 
the various subsets of resources (e.g. national and regional level, institutional bodies) and 
components; more work is thus needed on adapting the model and testing it in comparative 
empirical studies.     
The empirical analysis of the German case has shown that the framework captures 
well the key phenomena identified by existing qualitative and quantitative research: the 
centrality of CDU/CSU and to a less extent SPD in the German party system; their relative 
decline over time vis-à-vis medium and small competitors; the importance of alternation 
years; the general crisis of attractiveness of parties vis-à-vis society at large. At the same 
time, the tools used enable a more refined understanding of these dynamics. Firstly, from 
1991 to 2013 the overall societal strength of all German parties has declined strongly but not 
dramatically (-16.0 per cent). The veritable collapse in the participatory component has been 
accompanied by more moderate and irregular declines in the electoral and financial 
components and by a virtual stability of the governance one. Although the downward 
trajectory is unmistakeable, both average and end-period levels do not yet indicate a state of 
advanced crisis of German parties, which can still count on the electoral support of a large 
majority of citizens and on a comparatively substantial amount of financial and institutional 
resources. Secondly, in the same period the balance of systemic strength has tended to shift 
away from the two main parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) and toward alternative options, but 
again not to the point of fundamentally threatening their dominance. The overall strength of 
medium and small parties actually remained stable around 18-19 per cent until 2007; the 
strong gains of the subsequent period (2012: 29.3 per cent) were partially reversed in 2013 
(23.6 per cent). The relative decline of the people’s parties was strong at the electoral level (-
12.8 percentage points), more modest at the financial one (-6.5 percentage points) and 
absent in the other two components. Although the long-term tendency toward an increasing 
fragmentation of the German party system is likely to reassert itself after the reversal of the 
2013 federal election, CDU/CSU and SPD continue to exhibit a clear predominance and no 
fundamental break of this state is in the cards for the foreseeable future. Thirdly, the 
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electoral weakening of the people’s parties, far from leading toward an opening of the 
competition and of the politics of alliances, has actually led them to try to balance their 
losses by monopolising their control on executive offices. The fundamental shift in the 
dynamics of the system happened in the years 2002-2005, when the weakening of the SPD 
and the simultaneous rise of the radical left (PDS in the East, WASG in the West) largely 
destroyed the previous pattern of bi-polar alternation. The result has been a predominant 
pattern of grand coalition governments at the national (2005-2009, 2013-present) and 
regional (in the East and in Saarland) level, which shored up the role of CDU/CSU and SPD in 
the short-term but is likely to encourage new party births and further fragmentation in the 
medium-term.  
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